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David Johnson 
I became interested in the Honors Program because I saw it as 
the best way to get the best possible education at PSU and pre-
pare myself for graduate school. Little did I know that I would 
suffer a near overdose of Plato and that egotist Augustine. But 
I'm the better man for it all. Though I wonder what Freud 
would say about my development. 
Because I have the desire to drown myself in books, I am head-
ing off to the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign to 
see what kind of trouble I can find in the third largest academ-
ic library in the United States. As a side pursuit, I will be 
undertaking graduate studies in modern German history with 
hopes of eventually earning my Ph. D. Along the way, I hope 
to get back to Germany a couple of times, disguising my quest 
of following the Fussball Bundesliga with research in Germany's 
big libraries and archives. 
Kurt Tucholsky was born in Berlin in 1890. He served on the 
eastern front in the First World War, but was involved in sup-
plies and did not see combat. Returning' from the war, 
Tucholsky turned all his attention to writing. Working primari-
ly for the weekly Weltbuhne, he wrote under five names, 
including his own. In 1933, the Nazis burned his writings. In 
1935, disillusioned with his native Germany and terribly 
depressed about the state of his own life, he committed suicide 
at his home in Sweden. 
Kurt T ucholsky: 
Left-Wing Intellectual and 
Politically-Engaged Journalist 
In the political culture of the Weimar Republic, there were 
few calm moments. Chaos, irony, and paradox moved through 
the currents of time without causing the least bit of surprise. 
Harold Poor has written: "Creativity and chaos, brilliance and 
stupidity, mania and calm, paradox and contrast-such was 
Weimar" (Poor, 66). There was an explosion of cultural activi-
ty, as Expressionism tested the limits, theater experimented with 
new forms, and the new media of film thrilled the masses. But 
there was also the rise of political violence; tolerated by many 
and even explicitly encouraged by others. The economy, rav-
aged by wartime policies, remained weak and vulnerable to the 
vicissitudes of the world markets. Above all, Germany was beset 
by a confrontation between the values of the old Reich and 
those now engendered by the new Republic. The times were far 
from stable. 
In this environment of confrontation and chaos, Kurt 
Tucholsky operated in the intellectual sphere. He was a left-wing 
intellectual and journalist, writing against the authoritarian val-
ues of the Wilhelmine Reich and in support of republican ones. 
The words which came from his typewriter were in opposition 
to the intdlectual traditions of the old Reich and the militaristic 
and authoritarian values professed by the old guard. Tucholsky 
saw the militaristic values of the old Reich re-emerging. It was 
these values which, Tucholsky believed, had to be overcome if 
the Republic was to have a long and fruitful future. 
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Critics of intellectuals have focused on the naive idealism of 
intellectuals and their tendency to withdraw from the political 
theater, instead concentrating on their respective specialties. 
Tucholsky did not fit into this group of intellectuals, as he was 
an active participant in the political debates of the day. He 
polemicized, satirized and criticized. He wrote poems and 
cabarets. When he saw a theme which needed to be addressed, 
he tackled it; often many times. He focused on real issues. His 
methods of satire and criticism were purposefully used to high-
light the real problems faced by Germany. Tucholsky may have 
not been an active member of a political party, but he definitely 
was a politically-engaged journalist. He did have a voice worth 
hearing. Focusing his criticism on the government institutions of 
the Wilhelmine Reich, Tucholsky above all targeted the military 
as the major threat to the new Republic. The military's influence 
stretched throughout society, even to the traditionally pacifistic 
Social Democratic Party. It was this pervasive infl uence and the 
corresponding respect and adulation the military enjoyed from 
the German public that Tucholsky believed must be destroyed. 
Concentrating on the early years of the Weimar Republic, specif-
ically 1919 to 1922, this paper will seek to prove the worth of 
Tucholsky's voice and the value of his efforts for the republican-
ization of Germany. 
I 
Prior to the First World War, there had been in Germany a 
strong distinction between the roles of the intellectual and the 
politician. The world of the intellectual was limited to the arena 
of ideas. He debated the trends within intellectual fields with 
colleagues, but left the political tasks to politicians. So long as 
one had personal and inner freedom, and this freedom was pro-
tected, there was no need for intellectuals to confront the 
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Imperial Chancellor Otto von Bismarck and other politicians 
over the control of the political realm. Most intellectuals were 
content with the stability provided by the Reich, especially when 
they compared their situation to the autocracy of Russia and the 
corrupted liberalism of France (Stern, 17). 
Out of this contentment, Fritz Stern has argued a "Vulgar 
Idealism" developed in Germany after its 1871 unification 
(Stern, 17).1 In comparison to the idealism of the early nine-
teenth century, which had its roots in the Enlightenment and 
which had stressed equality of men, "Vulgar Idealism" instead 
stressed the superiority of German culture over foreign coun-
terparts. Stern believed that this new idealism was passively con-
sumed, elevated, and represented a claim to an exclusive pro-
prietorship of Kultur (Stern, 17).2 With the rise of "Vulgar 
Idealism," there emerged en masse the unpolitical: German, who 
denounced mass society, democracy, liberalism, modernity, and 
other "imports" from the west (Stern, 18). There was no con-
cern for practical matters, as these so-called unpolitical 
Germans dogmatically opposed realism, pragmatism, and mate-
rialism. These Germans justified their anathema toward politics 
by stressing their cultivated minds, which would only be soiled 
by involvement in politics. However, their idealized Kultur did 
have political effects, as social divisions within Germany were 
widened and sanctified (Stern, 19). Through the forces of 
Kultur, these unpolitical Germans, sought to fight the growing 
threat to the status quo by the working class. Kultur was hence 
elevated to a level unapproachable by the uneducated. Stern has 
written that this concept of Kultur was " .. .invested with the 
1. Not only the intellectuals were content with the political situation, but also was 
the vast majority of the bourgeoisie. I am focusing soldy on intdlecruals due to 
space and ,How of argument. 
2. The English word culture is not a suitable translation for Kultur. Kultur embod-
ies much more: civilization, state of mind, etc. 
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awe and reverence that Germans felt, or thought they should 
feel, for the diverse creations of the spirit, for the mystery of the 
arts that to so many possessed a voice as tender and as powerful 
as religion itself" (Stern, 5). Accordingly, this development of 
meaning for Kultur could be nothing but unfavorable to the 
development of democracy or of a cohesive society within 
Germany (Stern, 6). Irresponsibility and iniquity were rational-
ized. With this rejection of participatory politicS and idealiza-
tion of Kultur by the majority of intellectuals, came a great pro-
ductivitywithin the intellectual and scientific spheres. This pro-
ductivity seemed to justify the split between politics and intel-
lectual activity. As Stern argues, with the outbreak of war in 
1914, many believed the coming struggle would demonstrate 
the superiority of German Kultur in comparison to the selfish 
ideals and institutions of the west (Stern, 20).3 These were the 
nationalistic feelings which overtook Germany as a whole in 
August of 1914. Along with this elevation of Kultur came a 
loyal adulation and respect for the military and its values of obe-
dience, order, discipline, and strict control. 
II 
As the war dragged on and the assumed inevitable victory 
never came, there bred a disenchantment among German soci-
ety in their once optimistic feelings towards the war. Among 
some intellectuals, the British blockade of Germany and the 
resulting privation for the German population produced a 
change in attitude. There was a growing social protest among 
intellectuals against the values of German bourgeois society. 
3. Stern writes that there has been a misinterpretation of Germany being militaristic 
in 1914. He bdieved that the great enthusiasm of 1914 was not due to militarism 
or chauvinism, but rather due to the decades·long search for the moral equivalent 
of war. In the war they had found their equivalent of morality 
112 
The historians Istvan Deak and Peter Gay have both seen this 
protest symbolically as a father-son conHict.4 The son, repre-
senting democracy, modernity, and progress, was poised against 
the father, who embodied the conventional order, philistinism, 
and capitalism. It was the Fatherland that was guilty of over-dis-
cipline and the betrayal and misleading of the younger genera-
tion. The father's world had, therefore, to be repudiated so that 
Germany could join the community of nations in peace (Deak, 
69-70). It was a struggle over the interpretation and control of 
Kultur and for the future of Germany. Instead of the ritualistic 
repeating of past German cultural accomplishments, there had 
to be a progressive, ever-creative, and modern .KUlturdeveloped.5 
When Germany had finally lost the war, and the 
Revolution came in November of 1918, there arose a great 
euphoria among left-wing intellectuals.6 These left-wing intel-
lectuals believed that they were destined to play an important 
role in the reshaping of Germany after the war (Deak, 68). 
These intellectuals saw themselves as those justified to shape 
the new post-war Germany and viewed the future optimisti-
cally. In contrast to the ubiquity of the unpolitical attitude 
before the war, many intellectuals began outlining possible 
structures of government and plans for their future political 
involvement. There was widespread confidence in the coming 
birth of a new socialist state. "Forward" became the only direc-
tion for their thought. According to Peter Gay, the cultural task 
of these intellectuals was to restore the broken ties which the 
4. Peter Gay, Outsitkr as Insider, and Deak., We/mars left-Wing Intellectuals. 
5. An example for such a change in attitude could be found in Thomas Mann. 
Mann had published ObsmJations of an Unpolitical Man in 1918, espousing the 
vinues of the politically uninvolved intellectual. In the early years of the 
Republic. Mann's attitude would change, eventually leading up to his novd The 
Magic Mountain (1924), which stressed the need for political involvement. 
6. "Left-wing" intellectuals is a term used to describe intellectuals who were either 
Marxists anell or sympathetic to leftist ideas. 
113 
war had caused in German society (Gay, 8). An example for 
this new activism could be seen in Kurt Hiller. According to 
Hiller, the new German state would be run by intellectuals, 
echoing the platonic vision of rule by philosopher kings/ 
Hiller went so far as to layout the fundamental laws of the new 
state (Deak, 71).8 Even the famed architect Walter Gropius 
realized a social responsibility because of the lost war and the 
resulting exposure of the bankruptcy of German Kultur. He 
said: "This is more than just a lost war. A world has come to 
an end. We must seek a radical solution to our problems" 
(Gay,8-9). 
A belief in the inviolability of the intellect circulated 
among these intellectuals.9 The power of the intellect would 
enable condemnation of the father and fatherland and allow a 
spiritual regeneration and universal reconciliation (Deak, 70). 
With this increased sense of their worth, intellectuals 
approached the revolutionary days full of hope. For the jour-
nalists of the weekly Weltbahne, Istvan Deak writes, the future 
(( ... inspired optimism in the possibility of humanity's ethical 
and social regeneration" (Deak, 68). Among the writers for the 
Weltbahne was Kurt Tucholsky. 
The euphoria however did not last long. Many intellectuals 
quickly soured on the Republic. As government-sponsored 
Freikorps paramilitary groups restored order and suppressed rev-
olutionary activity, a general aversion towards the government 
7. Plato laid out this vision in the Republic. Those educated in the proper meth-
ods and in the proper material would be the rulers of society. 
8. Among these laws: War was to be outlawed; there would be an equal distribu-
tion of all material goods as well as a minimum wage; and suppression of par-
liament if they opposed the will of the intdlect. The last law reflected Hiller's 
faith in the power of reason. 
9. Such a concept reminds one of the ideas of the Enlightenment, with its empha-
sis on the power of reason, the inviolability of the intellect, and a bdief in 
inevitable progress. 
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resurfaced among many intellectuals.1o With the passing of the 
Weimar constitution, many intellectuals objected to the rem-
nants of the old imperial regime that remained in the Republic, 
namdy the bureaucracy, the judicial system, and most impor-
tantly, the military. 
Once optimistic over the promise of the Republic, many left-
wing intellectuals now became disgusted with the system. The 
hopes for a state governed by intellectuals were quickly crushed 
by the political realities. These intdlectuals had never had any 
recourse to power. They had .no trade union, no paramilitary 
group backing their interests, and they had not been among 
those politically active in the old Wilhdmine Reich. ll The party 
that would have been the most logical fit for voicing their inter-
ests, the Social Democratic Party, these left-wing intellectuals 
found dull and its leadership intellectually weak and feeble-
minded (Laqueur, 47-48). The leaders of the SPD were, more-
over, too conservative in their cultural views. 
In the leaders of the SPD, many left-wing intellectuals saw 
petty-bourgeois aspirations. According to Walter Laqueur, left-
wing intellectuals discovered that even among the workers there 
existed hopes for "bourgeois philistinisni' (Laqueur, 48-49). The 
SPD leaders were mere functionaries whose only desire, next to 
entering the bourgeoisie, appeared be among the workers, drink-
ing beer and playing cards. A new Bebd, a Marx, a new Lassalle, 
or some other charismatic leader had not emerged. Instead, the 
10. The Free Corps were paramilitary groups organized to maintain order in German 
cities and prevent an ovenhrow of the provisional republican Government by the 
Spanacists and other leftist groups. Unfortunately, these Free Corps went beyond 
their limits of power and murdered and beat suspected revolutionaries, often with-
out retribution for these actions. 
11. KUrt Hiller did try to organize intellectuals into the Rat der Geistiger Arbeiter. 
However, the interests and egos of the intellectuals that did join could not be 
combined into a workable council. The council passed away rather quicldy. 
KUrt Tucholsky was never a member. 
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leaders of the SPD were weak, irresolute, and uninspIrIng 
(Laqueur, 50). Few intellectuals joined the party. Many intellec-
tuals felt themselves alienated from such a party, and intellectu-
ally and culturally superior to the bourgeoisie and those workers 
striving to become members of it. Laqueur seems to be trans-
posing a similar idea to Stern's concept of "Vulgar Idealism" onto 
left-wing intellectuals. Again an idealized, non-existent culture is 
used to define strata in society. Left-wing intellectuals, earlier 
enthusiastic over political involvement, again became unpolitical 
due to their belief in the superiority of their thought (Laqueur, 
48-49).12 
This avoidance of an alliance by left-wing intellectuals with 
the SPD has often been criticized by historians. Laqueur 
writes: 
Whatever [the left-wing intellectuals] did or refrained from doing 
was of no public interest except to provide grist to the mills of 
Goebbels and Alfred Rosenberg. The struggle proceeded in the 
streets, the political assemblies, the beer-halls, the party headquar-
te~s, anywhere but the places frequented by the intellectuals. 
(Laqueur, 71). 
According to Laqueur, the intellectuals were isolated from the 
real world. They were unaware of the real situations faced by 
Germans, and did nothing to seek these out. Nor did they fight 
for their ideals in parliament. The public took no interest in 
the intellectuals because they took no interest in the public. 
12. It is interesting that the SPD leaders viewed these intdlectuals with the same 
degree of contempt. According to many in the SPD, the intellectuals had no 
interest in performing the necessary day to day tasks. Instead, they immersed 
themsdves in utopian and futuristic visions, while neglecting pragmatic and real 
concerns. The intdlectuals lacked political judgment and tactical ability. There 
was no place for them in a party specifically designed to work for the real inter-
ests of the working class. 
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III 
Lack of public interest was certainly a dilemma for left-wing 
intellectuals and above all, for Kurt Tucholsky. Tucholsky has 
been called a foe of the Republic; a writer unable to recognize the 
ettent of freedom the Republic offered in comparison to that 
before the war (Zwerenz, 57). Such criticism seems to be influ-
enced by GUf knowledge of the end of the Weimar Republic. For 
example, Laqueur writes that Tucholsky and other intellectuals 
would be enlightened to the error of their ways by the brutality 
of the Nazi dictatorship (Laqueur, 45-47). Such a statement 
demonstrates the benefit of hindsight. 
While a quick skimming of his works might lead one to 
believe T ucholsky was against the Republic, criticism of this kind 
is unwarranted when Tucholsky's writings are thoroughly stud-
ied. He was indeed a supporter of the Republic. Tucholsky was 
not fighting against the existence of the Republic, he was instead 
combating the weaknesses and hypocrisies of the democracy and 
the refusal of government representatives to overcome these 
shortcomings. Foremost among these shortcomings was the 
ongoing influence of the conservative-reactionary class, and the 
unfortunate adaptation of the SPD to this influence (Zwerenz, 
57). Tucholsky was seeking to inform the public of its misplaced 
loyalty to such values. That he was not a loyal advocate and blind 
supporter of governmental policies should not be considered a 
weakness, rather a virtue". His calls for greater reform should not 
be seen as misguided, but as constructive attempts to ameliorate 
living conditions and Germany's standing in th.e world. 
Tucholsky wanted to improve the Republic, not destroy it. 
Tucholsky was also not rejecting politics, only certain poli-
cies. He was not the against the SPD as a political party, only 
against its leaders who advocated and implemented poor policies 
(HeB, 92). The worst example of such a poor and short-sighted 
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policy was the SPD's agreement with the military on the 10th of 
November, 1918 (Kolb, 13).1,3 This agreement helped the mili-
tary recover its strength and confidence after the lost war. It also 
reawakened the influence of the military in German society.14 
Despite Tucholsky's disappointment with the weak SPD 
leadership, he did not join the Communist Party. To him, the 
Communists were undemocratic and authoritarian. Tucholsky's 
heart lay with the workers, but he held no utopian visions of a 
coming worker's paradise. He believed it was his responsibility to 
remain on the outside, to point out errors and possible threats to 
the Republic. His job as critic, according to Gerhard Zwerenz, 
was to " ... desanctify sacred cows; he did not have to become 
their herdsman in the process" (Zwerenz, 86). Tucholsky sought 
a society where everyone would have equal opportunities to 
increase their standard of living and well-being. That he felt 
more empathy for the historically-suppressed worker was based 
on the greater barriers to advancement which the worker faced. 
, Many left-wing intellectuals were indeed idealistic and ign'o-
rant of the real world, but a few did manage to create for them-
selves a voice that was heard; a voice that held true to ideals 
which corresponded to political realities. An example of such an 
intellectual was Maximillian Harden. Harden had been a vocal 
critic of governmental policies and social traditions in the 
Wilhelmine years and continued his criticism into the Republic. 
Harden had been very much involved in the happenings of his 
13. The agreement was reached by the SPD leader and later Republic President 
Friedrich Ebert and the head of the General Sta.ft General Groener. In this agree-
ment, the SPD and the military sought to maintain peace and order and to pre-
vent the seizure of power by the radical left, represented foremost by the 
Spartacists. The military pledged its loyalty to the SPD led government and its 
support of the founding of a Republic. Unforrunately, this "maintenance" of order 
resulted in countless murders of leftists and republican sympathizers 
14. For the historiography of this agreement, see Kolb. Die Weimarer Republik. 
157-82. 
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day and was a significant political figure, even if he never held an 
office. The ideas of a writer like Harden cannot simply be dis-
missed as naive and idealistic. These ideas represented a voice of 
opposition that reflected the period and its events. That Harden 
was active for many years suggests the relevance of his writings. 
Somebody had to be reading him in order to justify his contin-
ued employment. 
Kurt T ucholsky was an intellectual in the spirit of 
Maximillian Harden. Like Harden, and in contrast to other left-
wing intellectuals of the day, T ucholsky approached the future of 
Germany very cautiously and pragmatically. He refrained from 
idealistic visions of an intellectual-led Republic. Tucholsky was 
an engaged journalist, commenting often on the political hap-
penings of the day. Further, Tucholsky was consistent in his mes-
sage and his style. In his writings, Tucholsky's subject matter and 
objects of criticism remained constant. He did not let up. 
Such consistency was evident in Tucholsky at an early age. In 
a 1911 visit to Prague, he was able to meet Franz Kafka. This 
meeting made enough of an impression on Kafka that he noted 
it in his diary. He called Tucholsky an "entirely consistent per-
son" (Poor, 12). Such an impression of the then law student 
Tucholsky by an astute observer like Kafka points to the intensi-
ty Tucholsky brought to his life even in his early days. Such 
intensity would never leave Tucholsky. 
Tucholsky was not a passive observer but an involved and 
critical one. In comparison to other left-wing intellectuals 
who withdrew from the scene, Tucholsky remained: polemi-
cizing and propagandizing. He displayed the most energy, 
insight, and satiric brilliance of any left-wing intellectual 
active at this time (Poor, 5). He was a keen observer. In 
October of 1918, he wrote a letter to his fiancee Mary 
describing the importance of the coming weeks: "One is 
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allowed quite well to say that the fate of Germany for the 
next 200 years depends on the next few weeks" (Tucholsky, 
412)}5 He sensed the coming revolution and quite possibly 
the abdication of Wilhelm II and the establishment of a new 
political and social order.16 In the same letter he also 
addressed a theme he would stress often after the founding of 
the Republic; that of the ongoing adulation Germans pro-
fessed for military and authoritarian values. He wrote: "The 
mistakes, which we have criticized and continue to criticize, 
have not been wiped froin the Germans, instead only pushed 
just under the surface [heruntergesetzt]; these mistakes are not 
in the open-but are nevertheless still alive" (Tucholsky, 
412). These mistakes were the adulation of the military and 
belief in the cultural superiority of Germany; the same values 
held by the "Vulgar Idealists" before the war.17 Tucholsky 
would fight against these traits diligently and prolifically. He 
was a key figure in the history of the Republic and also a sym-
bol for it. He represented the freedoms gained; The freedom 
to write freely and without censorship; the freedom to criti-
cize and to make suggestions. 
Tucholsky wrote for many newspapers and journals, but 
he contributed most often to the Weltbuhne, the weekly jour-
nal that served to comment on both the political and cultural 
scene in Germany from a leftist perspective. The Weltbuhne 
15. From a letter dated the 23rd of October, 1918. Tucholsky, Ausgewiihlte Briefl, 
1913-1935. 
16. The Revolution he sensed broke out on November 9th, 1918 with the found-
ing the of the Republic. The Kaiser abdicated two days later. 
17. "Vulgar Idealism" is of course a term coined by Fritz Stem. I use it here and later 
in the paper to describe the values ofTucholsky's targets for criticism. 
18. Tucholsky also wrote under four pseudonyms plus his own name. Yet. he never 
hid the true writer behind the name. He was not seeking to protect himself from 
what he wrote. See 'Wlr Aile Funrin Kurt Tucholsky, Gesammelte Werke, Band 
I. 1041-1043. Also Kurt Koszyk. Die deutsche Presse, 285. 
120 
had a small circulation, 16,000 at its peak (Koszyk, 285).18 
This small circulation would seem to confirm Laqueur's view 
that indeed, these intellectuals were only writing for them-
selves. Others have argued, however, that the Weltbuhnewas in 
fact significant beyond the realm of unpolitical left-wing intel-
lectuals (Mosse, 173). The Weltbuhne was on newsstands 
throughout Europe and was read regularly by responsible 
members of the rightist intelligentsia as well as by the left 
(Poor, 66), Although the Weltbuhne never enjoyed widespread 
popularity, it was significant, presenting weekly a consistent 
message representing the left intelligentsia in Germany. Kurt 
Koszyk has written that ",., [the Weltbuhne's] significance lay 
primarily in the fact that it brought the opinions of an impor-
tant political group to weekly expression" (Koszyk, 285). That 
the Weltbuhne was read by even those on the right-who used 
its content for their own dubious means-provides evidence 
of its significance. 
Th:is significance, however, does not clarify the effective-
ness ofTucholsky as an individual writer. Laqueur singles out 
T ucholsky as providing an example for the ineffectiveness of 
left-wing intellectual activity. While he calls Tucholsky the 
" ... most brilliant and most fertile German satirist since 
Heinrich Heine," these brilliant writings only served the inter-
ests of the far right (Laqueur, 45),19 Due to the anti-monar-
chical and anti-military content of such writings, the left-wing 
intellectuals were called traitors and named symbols of the 
decadent republic. Moreover, Laqueur states that writers such 
as Tucholsky were not thankful for the freedoms they pos-
19. Laqueur primarily bases his criticism of T ucholsky on his later writings. when 
Tucholsky was personally frustrated and distraught over the course of Weimar 
politics. It was in these days that Tucholsky wrote more often for Communist 
publications. He, however, did not join the party. 
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sessed. According to Laqueur, these writers argued that 
Germany was more reactionary than ever, including seeming-
ly Republic-friendly politicians, from Gustav Stresemann to 
even the SPD.20 Laqueur states that even Tucholsky was not 
immune to falling into this helpless political isolation 
(Laqueur, 45-47). 
Unfortunately, Tucholsky's writings would prove to be 
ineffective. They did not lead to a strong republic, filled with 
open-minded Germans. This failure, however, was not the 
result of self-imposed isolation and by political naivete on the 
part of Tucholsky. He knew exactly what was occurring in 
Germany and wrote incessantly about it. 
It was not Tucholsky's job to save the Republic. He was a 
journalist reporting and commenting on what he observed. 
To hold the journalist responsible for supplying solutions is 
problematic. Tucholsky made suggestions, and he also point-
ed out the necessity of reform and the consequences if it 
were not carried out. He sought to enlighten and persuade 
his readers through his voluminous writings. That circula-
tions were small should not be held against him. He did not 
rely solely on idealistic visions but also emphasized the need 
for real, and very possible reform. Anton Austermann has 
written, "That kind of Journalism was foreign to him which 
was distant from the public reality and existent only in pri-
vate and exclusive conversation with the societal powers" 
(Poor, 9). Tucholsky was seeking to speak directly with the 
masses, calling on them to personally rid themselves of the 
burdens of servility to the Prussian Herrschaft (King, 40). By 
doing so, the old system would collapse from its own weight. 
His readers were enlightened wittily, satirically, and with 
20. Stresemann was Chancellor of the Republic for three months in 1923 and 
Foreign Minister from 1923 to 1929. 
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charm over the contemporary reality of communications 
(Austermann, 14).21 
Because Tucholsky used satire and criticism as his methods of 
style, one could easily pass Tucholsky's writings off ~ not appro-
priate for a mass audience, as they required a certain level of edu-
cation for purposes of comprehension. His methods corre-
sponded neith~r to the well-to-do nor to the existing political 
partieS ot institutions. They instead appealed to those disillu-
sioned with politics and not to the fundamental values of regu-
lar German citizens, due to Tucholsky's primary focus on the 
negative aspects of German society (HeB, 38),22 Tucholsky, how-
ever, during the first years of the Republic, did focus on topics 
important and relevant to all Germans, That he used satire and 
criticism to portray these topics should not take away from the 
seriousness and effort Tucholsky devoted to enlightening the 
German public to the real problems of the day. Harold Poor 
addresses this judgment as he observes Tucholsky's methods. 
According to Poor, Tucholsky often did state idealistic, vague, 
and often hopeless goals, but he examined individual govern-
ment policies and actions as well, on a practical level (Poor, 86-
87). Tucholsky would point out errors and offer suggestions for 
their rectification. 'While it was true that Tucholsky held up the 
ideal of a more humane and democratic culture, he also knew 
this ideal could not be ingrained in the minds of the Germans 
21. Anton Austermann sees Tucholsky as the great Historiograph of the Weimar 
Republic as his works serve as a chronological reflection and informal history of 
the Republic. The major events of the period are portrayed in his writings. He 
is more popular today than ever. Up to 1980, over 6 million copies of volumes 
of his work have been saId. 
22. Dieter HeR, "Personalisierung als Strategie. Kurt Tucholskys publizistische 
Auseinandersetzung mit den sozialistischen Parteien der Weirnarer Republik" in 
Kurt Tucholsky Sieben Beitrage zu Werk und Wirkung, ed. Irmgaard 
Ackermann, 96~7. Golo Mann as quoted in William John King, Kurt 
Tucholsky als politischer Publizist. 38. 
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overnight. It could only be achieved in the classrooms and in 
reforms of government institutions. By this slow, gradual, and 
patient process, the inner spirit of society might be changed 
(Poor, 86-87). He used criticism and satire to enlighten his fel-
low Germans about the corruption and abuses committed by 
the old institutions in order to prevent these past sins from 
being repeated.23 While Tucholsky was rejecting the old institu-
tions, he was simultaneously propagating democratic values 
which, he hoped, would lead Germany into a peaceful and pro-
ductive future. 
In two articles from 1919, "Was darf die Satire?" and "Wir 
Negativen," Tucholsky defended his satirical and critical 
approach. Tucholsky saw satire as an " ... absolutely positive 
method" (Tucholsky, 362). He added: "Nowhere else are those 
lacking character more quickly exposed" (Tucholsky, 362). 
Further, exaggeratIon was necessary at this time in order to " ... 
blast open the truth, so that it becomes more clear" (Tucholsky, 
363). No one should be kept safe from the satirist's gaze. 
According to Tucholsky, there was " ... no upstanding man or 
class that should not be able to take criticism" (Tucholsky, 364). 
Satire had to have no limits. Otherwise, the real truth could not 
be learned by the German public. 
In "Wir Negativen," Tucholsky fully addressed his critics. He 
could not affirm a society in which a sizable number of its citi-
zens remained anti-republican and undemocratic. This was the 
" ... central point of Germany's current misery" (Tucholsky, 372). 
Germany was a land of soldiers, totally lacking in culture, and a 
land where the worst instincts of its citizens were constantly 
aroused and encouraged (Tucholsky, 373). In response to this 
23. See Tucholsky's piece "Wir Negativen" for a classic example of his methods. 
Kurt Tucholsky, Gesammdte Werke, Band I, 372-377. See also King, 
Tucholsky, 38. 
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situation, Tucholsky laconi~ly asked: "And to' that we should 
say yes?" (Tucholsky, 373) Tucholsky, however, was not writing 
out of hatred for Germans. He wrote: "We want to fight with 
hate out of reasons of love. We are struggling out of love for the 
repressed, who must not necessarily always be proletarians. We 
love the thoughts of humanity which lie in the thoughts of 
humans" (Tucholsky, 377). In order for these humanitarian 
thoughts to spread and prosper, a change in the attitude and 
character of Germans had to transpire: 
We should make positive suggestions. But all the positive sugges~ 
dons benefit nothing, if the correct level of honesty and integrity to 
do not move through the land. The reforms, in which we believe, 
are not to be implemented with regulations, nor with imperial 
offices. We do not believe that it suffices to build up a filing cabinet 
and a large, multi~faceted personnel to settle this problem. What is 
needed is the proper chiracter[anstiindige GesinnuniJ. (Tucholsky, 
375~76) 
This proper character was to be obtained not only through 
reform of institutions but through emphasis on educational 
reform and promotion of positive German culture, which 
stressed freedom of ideas and freedom of the individual to 
make his or her own choices. What was collectively done to 
improve the situation should in no way interfere with individ-
ual freedom (Tucholsky, 375). 
According to Tucholsky, there were two Germanys. One was 
free, the other servile (knechtisch) (Tucholsky, 993). In order for 
the free Germany, represented by the Republic, to win this strug-
gle, there must be propaganda made for it. Unfortunately, 
Tucholsky saw few defenders of or advocates for the Republic 
because few republicans were in decisive positions within the 
Republic (Tucholsky, 993). There existed no widespread move-
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ment in support of the Republic. According to Jorg Schonert, 
Tucholsky's use of satire and criticism·, therefore, was part of his 
strategy for achieving positive results through negative means. 
Through unconditional attacks he sought to point out the neg-
atives and remnants ~f the old system and to establish a common 
interest in the establishment of a thorough renewal of Germany 
(Schonert, 80). Further, Schonert believes Tucholsky's methods 
were an example of the bourgeois tradition of the Enlightenment 
which strove for a better morality and a free society and sought 
to preserve these values in the face of constant attacks (Schonert, 
82). Criticism and satire were legitimate and traditional tools in 
this form of struggle (Schonert, 82). 
Tucholsky was indeed not politically isolated, as Laqueur 
believes, but rather politically involved. In referring to left-wing 
intellectuals and with no doubt, Tucholsky as well in mind, Kurt 
Koszyk writes: "These so-called outsiders partly formed the 
image of the Republic. Therefore, the Republic was identified 
with their names" (Koszyk, 284). Through this identification 
came also, for Tucholsky, evidence of his involvement in the 
Republic. 
Tucholsky recognized his own problematic and ambivalent 
relationship to the Republic (HeB, 108). He recognized he was 
an intellectual serving as a critic of a Republic he supported but 
in which he saw many dangerous flaws. Dieter HeB writes that 
Tucholsky's detachment from both the left and the right enabled 
and legitimized his criticism and warnings (HeB, 108). He was a 
-journalist reporting and commenting on the shortsightedness 
and the shortcomings of governmental policies. Tucholsky him-
self saw his own role as follows: 
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The world must not be seen entirely from above; isolated. against 
and distant from everyone. Instead. one must be among the mass-
es--as leader, or adversary, or aristocrat, or monk, but among the 
masses. The journal, in which it can say that it belongs to one or to 
all is good; the deed that an individual can do with all or for all is 
even better. (Koszyk,285).14 
With this statement, Tucholsky does not fit into the generaliza-
tions of Laqueur.25 Tucholsky indeed recognized the need to 
understand the masses, but also to make the effort to be among 
them andt~ influence them. As will be shown below, Tucholsky 
was an active participant in the Weimar Republic, especially in 
its early years. He cannot be dismissed as a mere source for 
rightist propaganda. He actively wrote propaganda for his own 
cause. Although he was not a government official, he neverthe-
less used words as his deeds. He was writing the good fight. 
Tucholsky did not fall back on utopian visions of society 
(Zimmerman, 109). He approached his work pragmatically. He 
did not join specific intellectual organizations, nor did he 
become a long-time member of a political party (Austermann, 
20).26 That he was not an active member of a political party can 
be a point for criticism. However, one need not be an active 
party member to be a political participant. Although Tucholsky 
was writing in an age without television or even widespread 
radio, the subject matter he addressed and criticized was politi-
cally-oriented and his criticism did not go unnoticed by politi-
cians (Tucholsky, 3).27 He possessed a voice which came often 
24. Quote by Tucholsky, 1927. 
25. See above. 
26. Tucholsky did join the Independant Socialists (USPD) for a short time from 
March 1920 to 1922, when the Independents joined the Majority Social 
Democrats (SPD). As mentioned before, Tucholsky was never a member of the 
Rat der Geistiger Arbeiter. 
27. Above all, politicians of the Right and the Nazis were very aware of his political 
writings. In 1933, Tucholsky was in the first group of authors to have their 
books burned by the Nazis. His writings were burned on May 10, 1933. 
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and consistently. Anton Austermann believes that Tucholsky 
had the confidence that he could playa positive role from the 
position of being a sharp critic of the existing political condi-
tions. From this vantage point, he could excite self-action in 
those affected by these conditions. At least initially, Tucholsky 
believed, according to Austermann, that an oath of all contem-
poraries of good will could be taken to uphold honesty 
(Redlichkeit), humanity, functional work (sachliche Arbeit), and 
the preeminence of the individual before the corporation and 
collectives (Austermann, 20).28 Such hopes displayed a connec-
tion to Enlightenment thought which optimistically believed in 
the progressive betterment of man through education. 
Tucholsky indeed held such hopes. 
Although writing in 1930, Tucholsky described his long-held 
goal of creating a new Germany: 
From Teutschland must Deutschland be made, and it must also be 
shown that besides Hitler, Hugenberg und those fochkalten 
University types of the year 1930, there are still other kinds of 
Germans. Every reader can participate in this effort. If he does that 
in his own district through the deed, that will be our highest 
achievement. (Austermann, 53)29 
Tucholsky sought the active participation of his readers to help 
in changing the system. He hoped that Germany would begin 
with a tabula rasa, ensuring a building up of new values and 
the complete destruction of the experiences and behavior evi-
dent in the Wilhelmine period. In so doing, Tucholsky wrote, 
28.Later, Tucholsky experienced great discouragement due to realization 
that majority of Germans were unwilling to commit to new values. 
29. Teutschland refers to a Germany led by teutonic warriors whose present 
embodiment was the Prussian military. Deutschland referred to what 
Germany should be. Fischkalten refers to people who are resistant to 
new ideas. 
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"The claim of authority held by such institutions as the mili-
tary, church, bureaucracy, and justice system would be effec-
tively shaken to their foundations" (Schonert, 81).30 Tucholsky 
believed it was his job to influence, as best he could, public 
support for the Republic. If that meant using satire and 
emphasizing democratic and humane ideals, he would utilize 
those means. Austermann confirms this approach: 
In face of the power of latent and open anti-republican propaganda 
in the Weimar Republic, Tucholsk)r believed that the survival of the 
Republic was far more dependent upon more than just an education 
campaign that merdy rested on the better argument. The majority 
of the German population was only to be won to the side of the 
Republic through sharp, immediate altercations with the anti-
republican forces. Propaganda was necessary in order to establish the 
Weimar Republic in the consciousness of the masses as their state. 
(Austermann, 164-65) 
Constant confrontations were necessary. Tucholsky not only 
demonstrated constancy and consistency with his arguments 
and tactics but also displayed an unmatched productivity. From 
November 1918 to December 1919 alone, Tucholsky wrote 
more than 150 essays and poems, in which he sought to expose 
the horrors of war, discredit Prussian authoritarianism and mil-
itarism, and in the end, to make a true revolution in German 
life (Poor, 49). In the weekly Weltbuhne he had a reliable means 
for conveying his voice. He mastered the short article, convey-
ing his message through poems, criticisms, satires, commen-
taries, polemics, reviews, and even through simple reports. 
Tucholsky wrote pieces which directly attacked the threats 
he saw to the fledgling Republic. Moreover, Tucholsky clearly 
30. The idea of a tabula ra.racorresponds well to Schonert's thesis ofTudlolsky's crit-
icism having its roots in the Enlightenment. Tucholsky from "Wir Negativen," 
quoted in Schonert, "Wir Negativen .. " in Ackermann, Tucho/sIty,81. 
129 
stated his vision of democracy, a'vision which was very much 
aware of the realities of German society, and not based <;>n ide-
alistic pipe dreams. He sought: 
A democracy, where one is free and conscious of his responsibility. 
A democracy, where people are not equal like the lined up numbers 
of a Prussian army company-that incarnation of a penitentiary 
state [Zuchthausstaa~-instead a democracy, where between a bank 
president and his poner, there exists no separation due to caste, 
only due to one's economic wdl-being and type of occupation. If 
they drink tea with 'each other is another matter. That they are both 
human is a for us cenain. (T ucholsky, 1042) 
Such a quote demonstrates no connection whatsoever to the 
goals of the Communist Party. What it does display is a clear 
recognition of the class realities that existed in Germany. 
Tucholsky was not advocating any nationalization of industries 
or redistribution of incomes. Rather, he sought a society in 
which everyone was equal before the law and in which everyone 
had equal opportunity. Tucholsky saw the values of Germany's 
"Vulgar Idealism" of the pre-war period as very much alive and 
gaining renewed strength and influence. Tucholskywas seeking, 
through his writings, like-minded Germans to aid in his strug-
gle for new values of equality and freedom. 
In 1920, Tucholsky listed the demands which he felt had to 
be fulfilled in order for the Republic to last. They were as fol-
lows: 
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1. Transformation of the Reichswehr int~ a People's Militia. 
Removal orall unnecessary and counter-revolutionary gener-
als and officers. 
2. Demilitarization -of the police. Forced retirement of all unre-
,liable officers, especially those active in the Provinces. 
3. Reform of the Justice System---especiallyat the prosecutory 
levels. Removal of all those loyal to the m~marchy. 
4. Democratization of the bureaucracy. Thorough pursuit and 
prosecution of all republican complaints. Firing of all 
bureaucrats, along with removal of pensions, whose anti-
republican politics have been proven. 
5. Strengthening of the national government vis-a-vis the 
states. 
6. Complete restructuring of educational methods and sub-
jects in the schools and universities. 
7. Immediate amnesty for all political prisoners who have been 
imprisoned for their republican actions. 
8. Above all, enlightenment and propaganda of the new 
republican ideas. Destruction of Prussian legends. Subjects 
become citizens. (Tucholsky, 997) 
These demands were unspecific in how they should be imple-
mented) but they did provide a framework for Tucholskis 
subject matter in his articles. Above all) Tucholsky sought the 
elimination of all anti-republican elements remaining in gov-
ernmental positions. The militarization of German society 
had invaded all government institutions. This invasion had to 
be countered with a republican one through ridding institu-
tions of military values and replacing them with republican 
values. 
Tucholsky attacked all remnants of the Wilhelmine Reich, 
but his main target was the pervasive militarism in German 
society. In a poem titled The Prussian Press, he pointed out the 
maIn enemy: 
Nur einen Feind hast du deines Geschlechts! 
Dec Feind steht rechts! (Tucholsky,429),1 
31. A poor translation of this runs: 
Only one enemy do you and your generation have! 
The enemy stands on me right! 
For the whole poem, see Tucholsky, "Preussische Presse," GtSllmmtlte Werke. 
Band I. 429. 
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The ultimate representative of the right for Tucholsky was 
the military. While the German bureaucracy, with its undy-
ing loyalties to the Wilhelmine Reich, and the judicial sys-
tem, with its own favoritism towards the old order, were 
often the focus of his attacks, it was the military whose val-
ues pervaded and influenced all levels of German society. 
The greatest threat to the new Republic's existence and suc-
cessfullife was militarism. Consequently, Tucholsky focused 
more on militarism in his writings than on any other subject 
in the first years of the Republic. The violent crushing of the 
Spartacist Revolt and the ensuing murders of the Spartacist 
leaders Rosa Lu~emberg and Karl Liebknecht by the rightist 
paramilitary groups called the Free Corps (Freikorps) served 
as the spark for Tucholsky's prolific writings in this period.32 
Harold Poor writes that it was at this time that Tucholsky 
" ... decisively entered his career as a writer and journalist" 
(Poor, 49}. 
Tucholsky could not understand why many Germans 
wished for a return to the times of the Wilhelmine Reich in 
which militaristic values dominated and which placed so 
many undue restrictions upon German citizens. He could not 
understand why Germans desired a return to an order in 
which they had been treated like and seen as dogs by their 
Prussian rulers (Tucholsky, 1042). It was the values of these 
Prussian rulers, values such as rigid strictness (catonische 
Strenge) and puritanical simplicity, which had led Germany to 
a disastrous war and humiliating defeat (Tucholsky, 1042). He 
believed these values had to be destroyed. 
32. Rosa Luxemberg and Karl Liebknecht were the leaders of the Spartacists. later 
the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). In January ofl919. they were among 
the leaders of the spontaneous Spartacist Uprising. Ill-planned and laclcing in 
mass ~upport. the uprising was easily crushed by government- sponsored forces 
called the Free Corps. 
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Tucholsky believed that Germans had a barracks mentality, 
and this mentality enabled militarism to remain the supreme 
value of German society (Poor, 78). According to Tucholsky, the 
destruction of these values, however, was almost impossible 
because they had been ingrained in the minds and beliefs of 
Germans from birth (Tucholsky, 590). Further, the development 
of this militarism had not been stopped in any way. In sporting 
and outdoor dubs, youths had been taught to organize them-
selves in units and undertake activities that emphasized main-
taining order and undivided respect for leaders. In schools, 
youths were taught to emulate and honor military officers, for it 
had been the military and the statesmanship of Bismarck that 
had unified Germany in 1871.33 As a result, Tucholsky believed 
Germans had acquired a need for a superior figure. He wrote, 
"The reasons for the cultural struggles are deep. The German, 
beaten up by tradition, needs something which he can place over 
himself in authority" (Tucholsky, 590). Through culture and 
education, the life of a German had been molded to resemble life 
in the military. The German became subservient to and needful 
of an authority figure. According to Tucholsky, the need for 
authority and the resulting adulation of the military made 
Germans blind to misuses of power. Germans refused to see 
wrong-doings because they wished to remain in their comfort-
able world, free of responsibility and full of monetary profits 
(Tucholsky, 590). The lost war was consequently regretted by 
many Germans because it had destroyed the old order of things 
(Tucholsky, 590). 
Tucholsky's writing~ were designed to enlighten the 
Germans to this reality. Unfortunately, he saw little .change. The 
33. Prior to 1871, Germany had not been unified. Through three wars in the 1860's 
and early 1870's, Prussia succeeded in unifying Germany under their control. 
For a summary of these events, see Gordon Craig, Germany 1866-1945. 
133 
Army General Staff remained, only under a different name to 
hide its existence from the Allies.34 Free Corps roamed through-
out Germany, committing acts of violence against those sus-
pected of disloyalty and republicanism. Referring to murders 
committed by Free Corps, Tucholsky wrote, "This world (that 
of the Free Corps) is without scruples, deeply untrustworthy, 
and honored and treasured by a great part of the population" 
(Tucholsky, 543). The ongoing belief in militaristic values con-
tributed to the concealment of crimes committed by the Free 
Corps and the lenient treatment those convicted received. 
Tucholsky wrote: "The disgrace of our military and our justice 
system are supported by a beaten up and proud bourgeoisie" 
(Tucholsky, 824). Tucholsky found this support likewise a dis-
grace for Germany. Through his writing, he hoped to show the 
military and the Free Corps for what they really were: exploita-
tive murderers and destroyers of humanity. In a satirical piece 
obviously designed to demonstrate the true attitude of military 
men, Tucholsky depicted a discussion among officers who had 
just killed citizens deemed disloyal: "Look how respectable the 
dogs are dressed. We should take their boots" (Tucholsky, 544). 
Such a piece displays Tucholsky's purpose of portraying the offi-
cers as inhumane thieves and destroyers of civilization. 
Tucholsky was directly targeting a real danger to German soci-
ety. He was reporting on the violent realities taking place on the 
streets of German cities. He was an engaged participant in the 
struggle to establish a real republic, with new values and new 
34. The General Staff, headed by Ludendorff and Hindenburg from 1915 to the 
end of the war.had almost dictatorial power during the war through the devel-
opment of an almost worshipping of their power and presumed infallibility by 
the German public. This staff was abolished after the war. as ordered by the vic-
torious Allies. However. the military was able to maintain the functions of the 
Staff through reorganization and trickery. See Gordon Craig. Politics of the 
Prussian Anny. 
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methods of action, emphasizing peace, equal opportunities, and 
democracy. 
Harold Poor has written that Tucholsky held the military 
responsible for the poverty in German civilization (Poor, 95). 
Instead of German civilization progressing from the roots laid 
by Goethe, Kant, Schiller, Beethoven, and others, the "Vulgar 
Idealism" of the past had re-emerged and negated the possibil-
ity of "good" Germans gaining prominence and creating for 
Germany a favorable reputation in the world. With the perva-
sive influence of the military and its authoritarian values, 
Germany had become a land of aggression and destruction. 
This struggle between the two Germanys, according to 
Tucholsky, was a clash between two worlds which did not 
speak the same language (Tucholsky, 357). Consequently, 
Tucholsky believed no revolution had taken place in 1918, 
rather a counter-revolution (Tucholsky, 407). The militaristic 
values had been resuscitated through the inability of the 
German people and their politicians to overcome their desire 
to be ruled authoritatively. Military generals had successfully 
maintained their basis of power. Tucholsky compared the situ-
ation in the early Republic to that of the 1848 failed revolu-
tion. He wrote: "We have lost the ideals of 1848 but kept the 
reaction. Politics have become nothing but constant squab-
bling. Please, God give us a couple of decent fellows so that we 
can overcome these terrible times and enter into a splendid 
spring" (Tucholsky, 170). 
The continued power and influence of the military brought 
fear to Tucholsky, for he believed there existed a strong likeli-
hood that the generals would destroy the Republic and unleash 
a new war of revenge against the Allied Powers (Poor, 95). The 
awe of the military which the public possessed would have to 
be replaced with a respect for ~nd willingness to serve the 
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Republic. Otherwise the Republic was doomed as were the 
hopes for a new humane German society. 
The German generals were the worst danger to the new 
Republic. They had no knowledge of humanity or of the real 
German spirit (Geist). They were unfamiliar with the creators of 
the true German spirit, represented by the writers Goethe, 
Friedrich Schiller, and others. Tucholsky wrote that these gener-
als instead « ••• thought with the biceps and wrote with the fists" 
(Tucholsky, 529), Further, they had no love whatsoever for the 
Republic. This lack of love inspired the military-adoring bureau-
crats also to despise the Republic. One was therefore severely 
limited in his career, if he was a republican (Tucholsky, 994). 
This was the situation Tucholsky sought to change and felt had' 
to be changed. He himself recognized the difficulty in this task: 
"How the journalists can correctly come to grips with this situa-
tiOh and finally close this chapter in world history-it must be a 
difficult job" (Tucholsky, 530). Indeed, Tucholsky saw it as the 
responsibility of journalists to tackle the problem of militarism 
in German society. He was attacking failed institutions that con-
tinued to persist without significant reform. Tucholsky was no 
dreamy-eyed idealist conceiving new logocratic visions of a 
world ruled by the intellectuals. He was directly fighting the 
greatest problem he saw in Germany; that of a military instilling 
in the German people its values of dominance and subservience. 
An example of the military's dominance in the life of 
Germans was illustrated in the phenomenon of the Generals 
Paul von l-lindenburg and Erich Ludendorff.35 Their continued 
35. Hindenburg and Ludendorff were the leaders of the Army General Staff from 
1915 to the end of the war. As the public only received censored accounts of the 
war, both Hindenburg and Ludendorff became through extensive government 
and military propaganda idols of the German populace. They were seen as infal-
lible and omniscient. As a result of this power. they eventually became the unof-
ficial rulers of Germany. even superseding the authority of Kaiser Wilhelm II. 
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popularity, despite the lost war, was indicative of the pervasive 
nature of the military values in German society. After the war, 
the German public was told of the "Stab in the Back Legend" 
(Dolchstoflegende) which was propagated foremost by the two 
generals. The Army had not lost the war, rather it had been the 
politicians of the left and other republicans that had undermined 
the inevitable victory. The military had successfully transferred 
its responsibility for Germany's defeat from itself to the new 
republican politicians who had had no say at any time in mili-
tary policies. Tucholsky documented this incredible occurrence 
as he attended a hearing in which both Hindenburg and 
Ludendorff participated (Tucholsky, 532). 
Tucholsky did not believe all Germans held Hindenburg and 
Ludendorff in high esteem, but that a significant majority cer-
tainly did (Tucholsky, 532). Both Hindenburg and Ludendorff 
were symbols of the military and its values. As a result, many 
Germans reserved a place of honor in their hearts for both men. 
The emotions and pride of the Germans had overcome their rea-
son. In reality, both Hindenburg and Ludendorff had been fail-
ures. They had not won the war. They were in fact murderers. In 
a satirical tone, Tucholsky wrote: 
Heroes? Heroes? What have these two to do with the hero concept? 
[They were merely] Administrative bureaucrats, well~nourished, 
constantly out of danger, and like Ludendorff, on the Eighteenth of 
November, leaving the country. (Tucholsky,531)36 
That this reality was overlooked by many Germans did not sur-
prise Tucholsky, for he believed these Germans secretly longed 
to have the opportunity to kick others around, and to be ruled 
36. Ludendorff initially fled Germany after the ceas~fire was signed because he 
feared arrest. He, of course, really had nothing to fear due to the high respect he 
enjoyed in Germany. 
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by a dictator. Only in these situations would such a German 
give his best. Germans desired order and to be subservient to 
this order, which only the military could provide (Tucholsky, 
530, 532), Sarcastically, Tucholsky wrote, "One must have lost 
a war to be so celebrated" (Tucholsky, 532). 
The German military stood in opposition to Tucholsky's goal 
of a new and vitalized German Republic. He wrote: "The entire 
German military, as it stands today, has nothing at all to do with 
the Republic. Its only worry is to create for itself a special flag, 
which reminds itself not of the hated black-red-gold, rather of 
the old monarchical towel" (Tucholsky, 994).37 The military 
remained forever loyal to its old benefactor, the monarchy. It 
could not be relied upon to support the Republic in times of 
need. Tucholsky believed the military and its companion, the 
Free Corps, had established the Republic as their new enemy 
after the armistice had taken away the Allied Powers as enemies 
because the fundamental need for soldiers was to create for 
themselves an enemy (Tucholsky, 820). He wrote that the Free 
Corps would have been formed " ... even in the deepest desert. 
The military had to create them. It was a question of blood. The 
Free Corps stand like empty taxis on the street or like ladies of 
the night at the corner, waiting for their buyee' (Tucholsky, 
821). Tucholsky added that the buyer did come, representing 
industrial interests and the philistine middle class (Tucholsky, 
820-21). These groups allowed militaristic values to enter the 
political world of the German Republic (T ucholsky, 820-21). 
This power of the military and its values made Tucholsky 
see the future of the Republic in black and white. According to 
Tucholsky, two worlds were colliding, and absolutely no bridge 
37. The "hated black-red-gold" refers to the new Rag of the Republic which replaced 
the black-red-white Rag of Prussia and the Reich. This "monarchical towel" 
remained as the Rag of the military. 
138 
existed that might reconcile the old and new values. Reflecting 
on the murders of Rosa Luxemberg and Karl Liebknecht, he 
wrote: 
Militarism is not dead, only temporarily put down. The miserable 
rest of it hides itself in Noske's gardens, which are so damaging 
because there, under the new flag, the old ideals are held high. 
There is again this false collective spirit of the "division," this fab-
ulous notion, placed higher than everything human. There is cor-
ruption, but always under the guise of correctness. There is the 
old, terrible outlook which we no longer want. (Tucholsky, 
418)38 
Tucholsky sought to fight this pervasiveness -of the military 
until ", .. no trace of it existed" (Tucholsky, 418). Germans had 
to rid themselves of the barracks mentality, and instead view it 
as the greatest hindrance to their progress as a nation 
(Tucholsky, 824). Tucholsky, however, did not see the Germans 
taking the necessary action to overcome the burdens of the 
past. He wrote: 
Action and spirit are two factors that are more distant from each 
other than ever. We have hundreds of dogmas of reflection, but 
hardly any of action. We resemble the centipede, who, despite 
considerable thought, still does not know which leg should be first 
raised and as a result, remains still. (Tucholsky, 169) 
According to Tucholsky, Germany was at a crossroads. It faced 
a choice. Germany might return to a past filled with corrup-
tion and destruction or enter a future, full of greater freedoms 
and membership in a community of nations. But in order to 
enter this future, Germany had to undergo a spiritual revolu-
tion, one without violence and political murders (Tucholsky, 
38. Gustav Noske was Defense Minister from 1919 to 1920. See bdow. 
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169). Without such a revolution, Germany was doomed to fall 
back into its dark and burdensome past. 
In the political parties of the Weimar Republic, T ucholsky 
saw agents working against the Republic. In the politicians of the 
German People's Party (DVP) and the German Nationalist 
People's Party (DNVP),39 Tucholsky saw activists working for a 
return to the monarchy. Some of these politicians tolerated the 
Republic, but they yearned secretly for a return of the 
Hohenzollerns.4o These politicians had no convictions and were 
merely opportunists using their cleverness and devious tricks to 
become important men in the new Republic (Tucholsky, 425).41 
Because of the prominence and activity of such politicians in the 
workings of government, Tucholsky called the Weimar Republic 
a "negative monarchy" and not truly a republic. The Republic 
was unable to protect itself because its enemies were active with-
in the Republic itself (Tucholsky, 993). Tucholsky saw the pre-
carious position in which the Republic found itself due to the 
continuing strength of the old institutions and above all the mil-
itary. In a graphic illustration of the lingering old values and 
their force of attraction, Tucholsky described shop owners who 
« •••• were flattered when they were allowed to have the Royal 
... " Supplier emblem on their shop window" and were consequent-
39. DVP stands for Deutsche Volksparteiwhile DNVP stands for Deutsche Nationak 
Volkspartei. The former was a remnant of the old National Liberal Party while 
the latter had its roots in the old Conservative Party and the right wing of the 
National Liberals. 
40. Hohenzollern was the name of the dynastic family that first served as Kings of 
Prussia and later as Emperors of Germany. 
41. To T ucholsky, there was no better example of such an opportunist than Walther 
Rathenau, foreign minister of the Weimar Republic and killed by right-wing 
radicals in 1922. Rathenau had been head of Germany's General Flectric (AEG) 
before the war. During the war he was responsible for armaments and supplies 
for the military. Tucholsky saw him as a monarchist in republican's clothing. 
The later Chancellor and foreign minister Gustav Stresemann provides another 
example of such an "opportunist. n 
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Iy so happy that « ••• they respectfully observed the droppings of 
the imperial horses" (Tucholsky, 1042). Despite the new' 
Republic, many Germans still longed for recognition as loyal 
monarchists. In order to change such attitudes, Tucholsky 
believed that new ideas had to be presented by new men 
(Tucholsky, 425). 
Logically, these new men should have been the leaders of 
the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Traditionally pacifist and 
anti-monarchist, the SPD was seen by many as the one party 
able to establish a strong Republic in Germany. However, in 
Tucholsky's eyes, militaristic values had successfully infiltrated 
even the SPD (Tucholsky, 169).42The policies of the SPD were 
a bitter disappointment to Tucholsky, for it should have been 
the party, with its pacifist heritage, to rid Germany of mili-
tarism. Instead, the leaders of the SPD sided with the military, 
in order to crush the January uprisings and maintain order. 
Tucholsky never forgave the SPD for its deeds during this 
time, especially' Defense Minister Gustav Noske, whom 
Tucholsky considered the worst offender (Tucholsky, 104). 
The SPD had betrayed not only its own constituency, but the 
entire German population, who had grown tired of war and 
its glorifications. The masses had wanted a new order, and 
Tucholsky crafted the sketches of this new order. As days and 
months passed, the masses forgot this new order. But 
Tucholsky did not. He refused to forget. His writings never 
strayed from his advocacy of a Germany absent of the author-
itarian military. One cannot consider him merely as an ideal-
ist. There had been an opportunity to' shift Germany away 
from its glorification of military values. The pervasiveness of 
42. Tucholskywas already critical of the SPD in 1914. after its vote to support to join 
the coalition in me Reichstag supponing the war dfort. He said, "The political 
opposition. the Progressives, and above aU the SPD have totaUy discredited them-
selves. We can no longer support our radicals, because mey aren't radicals.-
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these values had unfortunately been manifested in the leader .. 
ship of the SPD. 
Tucbolsky did not view the majority of SPD members 
responsible for this alliance with militaristic values. T ucholsky 
was even in agreement with many of the traditional maxims and 
goals of the SPD, but conflict came with the actual governmen-
tal policies of SPD leaders; foremost their pro-military policies. 
Tucholsky judged ~hese policies against the original principles of 
the SPD, that had developed during its long existence. Tucholsky 
pointed out the deficits from these principles and the conse-
quences thereof(Hd~, 89)."3 
Tucholsky's attacks on the SPD and its policies were high-
ly personalized as they primarily focused on the Defense 
Min~ster Gustav Noske and the President of the Republic, 
Friedrich Ebert."" Tucholsky's criticism of Noske was far more 
pointed than his accusations of Ebert. Tucholsky did regard 
Ebert as a man of integrity, even if he believed Ebert displayed 
too much flexibility in his workings with the old order (HeS, 
103). Noske, on the other hand, received no sign of respect 
from Tucholsky. Dieter HeB has written that Tucholsky viewed 
Noske as " ... politically incapable, morally unqualified, an anti-
democratic, and anti-republican character, and responsible for 
the misdevelopment of the Republic" (HeS, 101). Tucholsky 
sought the resignation of Noske as the first step in letting the 
Republic strengthen itself against the attacks of anti-republican 
elements and destroy the old military values which were work-
43. Tucholsky was a member of USPO from March 1920 to 1922. He saw them as 
the true representative of traditional principles of SPOt i.e. dissolution of 
Reichswehr. Tucholsky never voiced suppon however for the council move-
ment. a dictatorship of proletariat. or the nationalization of induSlry. He left the 
party when the USPO rejoined the Majority SPD. See also Austermann. 
TuchDlsky. 26. 
44. Friedrich Eben was President from January 1919 to his death in 1925. 
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ing with state support to destroy the Republic (Tucholsky, 
591).45 The question can be raised whether such a personalized 
strategy was effective in any way. Tucholsky was criticizing 
Noske without himself becoming actively involved in politics 
through a political party. Tucholsky, as a journalist, was not 
simply reporting events as he saw them but adding sometimes 
acerbic commentary to his observations. This of course did not 
change governmental policies, but Tucholsky was utilizing his 
right to criticize, which was one of the new rights gained in the 
Republic. It must be stated again that Tucholsky was very 
much involved in the events of the day even if he did not influ-
ence the actions of politicians. 
One can see Gustav Noske as a justifiable target for 
Tucholsky's pen. In a book written by Noske describing his time 
as Defense Minister, Noske referred to himself as the «blood-
hound" who did not shun the responsibility of using violent 
methods to crush rebellious activities (Noske, 68), Further, 
Noske considered Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemberg as those 
most responsible for the uprising in January of 1919. Their 
deaths, although tragic, were a result of their own exhortations 
to murder and violence {Noske, 75-6).46 Such a view, coming 
from a representative of the working class and the Republic, sick-
ened Tucholsky.47 A recent study of Gustav Noske's life by the 
45. This was written two months before the Kapp Putsch. 
46. Noske held Luxemberg and Liebknecht responsible for the peaceful revolution 
turning into a bloody civil war. In his memoirs, Noske stated that the SPD 
wanted no revolution and that it was its taking control of the government in 
1918 that prevented a full-out and chaotic civil war and a communist Germany. 
47. In Noske's defense, he overestimated the strength of the Spartacists and their 
threat to the overall stability of the new Republic as did many others. There 
were also many supply problems in regards to food and other necessities of life 
throughout Germany which required the maintenance of order. This is a compli-
cated manner aild deserving of a paper all its own. For purposes of space, it will 
not be discUssed further here. See Korb. Die Wdmarer RepubJik, for a good histo~ 
riographical discussion. 
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historian Wolfram Wette confirms Tucholsky's view of Noske as 
one overco~e by militaristic values. Wette writes: 
Noske had in fact no scruples when it came to using force. Indeed, 
he preferred using overwhelming force to achieve a "total" solution 
instead of seeking a political compromise. His behavior during the 
January uprising makes dear, that he only thought in terms of vic-
tory or defeat; values which came from the military environment. It 
is probable that the war experience positively influenced Noske's 
attitude towards the military-organized cult of force. As a result, 
instead of using police forces to maintain order, Noske used the mil-
itary. (Weue, 315) 
According to Wette, Noske was indeed heavily influenced by 
the militaristic values which permeated German society. 
Tucholsky considered Noske a fool and completely unaware 
of his being merely a tool of military interests. Tucholsky wrote: 
The reason why the completely incapable Noske must be constant-
ly reproached is that this former Social Democrat did not use the 
good opportunity to put out on the streetS all the profiteers of the 
old system. He does not see that they consider him a fool. 
(fucholsky,590)48 
Despite believing Noske to be a fool, Tucholsky realized he was 
nevertheless loved by the German population.49 To Tucholsky, 
this popularity was completely unjustified. Tucholsky wrote: 
48. It is interesting to note that Tucholsky called Noske a former Social Democrat, 
which he obviously was not. Tucholsky is referring to Noske's and other SPD 
leaders' disloyalty to the real maxims of the party. 
49. Tucholsky was not the only writer to view Noske as a fool and a tool of officers. 
In April 1929, a writer from the liberal Berliner Zeitungcalled Noske a prison-
er of the military officers. This writef further called Noske's policy of coopera-
tion with the military an egregious error and responsible for the deaths of many 
innocent Germans. See. Wolfram Wette, Gustav Noske. Eine politische 
Biographie,< 315. 
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Noske, the man of the street, the revolutionary minister, is by large 
segments of the population almost beloved. He is really a man lack-
ing in intelligence (tin kopfloser Mann). I have actually never seen in 
German politics--outside of the Kaiser-such a frightening mea-
sure of injudiciousness (Einsichtslosigkti~ in all matters. He has no 
idea what is going on. He does not know that there are forces at 
work which seek to conserve the terrible and old ways and help a 
completely barbarian class stand up again. He is clueless and as a 
result, helps these forces in this process. (Tucholsky,546) 
According to Tucholsky; Noske was responsible for the lack of 
. reform in the military leadership and in military structure, 
despite the proven ineptitude of military leaders and the result-
ing obvious need for reform (470). Observing the manner in 
which Noske operated among military leaders, Tucholsky satiri-
cally remarked that they all must be related in some way and that 
Noske was the successor (Fortsetzer) to Ludendorff's tradition of 
ineptitude and shame (Tucholsky, 470).50 
The danger of this intimate cooperation between Noske, the 
SPD, and the military was the continued suppression of repub-
lican ideas and anti-military and anti-monarchical elements. 
This suppression was manifested in the lack of sufficient pun-
ishment of rightist agitators who beat and killed leftists and 
republicans and the corresponding heavy punishment for con-
victed leftist agitators.51 Tucholsky held Noske and others in the 
50. Noske was indeed respected by some in military circles. According to the mili-
tary historian Harold Gordon, Noske received a "grudging respect" from the 
military for his methodical and practical approach to military matters. See 
Harold Gordon. The Reichswehr and the German Republic 1919-1926.331. 
51. For a contemporary study of violence in the early years of the Weimar Republic, 
see Emil Gumbd. Vier jahre politischer Mord, specifically page 81 .. Gumbel, a 
mathematician by trade. lists the number of murders committed by the left at 
twenty-two. The average sentence was fifteen years. The number of murders 
committed by those on the right was 354. The average sentence was four 
months. Four of the twenty-two leftists went unpunished. 326 of the rightists. 
Ten leftists were executed. No rightists were. 
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SPD leadership responsible for this lack of equal justice 
(Tucholsky, 546). He complained that there were always promis-
es made by the SPD and other so-called republicans to change 
the situation, but that every day it continued to persist and wors-
en. Trials were forgotten and the virtuous spirit of the German 
Officer Corps was always trumpeted instead as its representatives 
were acquitted or sentenced to probation or to serving a sus-
pended sentence. It was "the divine Noske" who allowed this jus- . 
tice system to continue its operations in such a manner 
(Tucholsky, 546). Noske and other SPD leaders were responsible 
for letting an atmosphere of violence and suppression of repub-
lican ideas linger and thrive. He wrote, "The cause of weakness 
is that no one dares make themselves available to take on the 
crowd. No one dares to kick out of the way the established right, 
the right that has acquired its rights and privileges dubiously and 
without work" (Tucholsky, 994). Those with courage, such as 
Mathias Erzberger, wound up dead or beaten (Tucholsky, 994).52 
Tucholsky believed Noske to be the worst of cowards. He wrote: 
It is completely unimportant to know whether Noske is acting with 
a good or bad conscience. He is a parasite, far worse than the 
ex:ploitive rich and their agents, worse than the farmer is to his dog. 
(419) 
It was Noske who had been responsible for the forty-nine deaths 
in Berlin during the January 1919 Uprising and for the reawak-
ening of the "German pest": militarism (Tucholsky, 821).53 To 
52. Mathias Erzberger was a leader of the Catholic Center Party. a German repre-
sentative at the Versailles Peace Conference. and later Finance Minister, His 
involvement at Versailles and in the Republic made him a target of rightist vio-
lence. He was murdered in 1922. Maximilian Harden. the journalist and critic. 
was also severdy beaten in 1922. 
53. Tucholsky's estimate of49 deaths is low. Other sources list as many as 156 dead. 
Perhaps Tucholsky was limiting his totals- to Berlin. See also Wette, Noske. 308. 
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Tucholsky, Noske was worse than. the old militarists because 
Noske had betrayed his original cause and the Germans who had 
believed in this cause. 
The harsh criticism of a specific person which Tucholsky 
directed towards ~osk.e is significant because of its constant and 
barrage-like nature. Tucholsky attacked Noske often during 
Noske's tenure as Defense Minister. In Noske, he saw the gov-
ernmental representative of militaristic values. That these values 
had influenced a Social Democratic minister was for Tucholsky 
a sign of their pervasiveness and power. The problem of the role 
of the military was very real. Tucholsky was not making it up to 
sell copies of the WeltbUhne. The violence in the streets, the free 
roaming of the Free Corps, the creation of the Stab-in-the-Back 
Legend, and the ongoing worship of the Generals Ludendorff 
and Hindenburg were for Tucholsky demonstrations of the 
power and influence of militaristic values. These values threat-
ened Germany's future and world peace. Due to this threat, 
Tucholsky engaged in his criticism and satire, in the hope of 
showing his fellow Germans the real danger posed to them 
because of their adulation of militaristic values. 
Kurt Tucholsky was far from an objective observer. He clear-
ly desired an authentic Republic and free society, with a new 
people's militia and new educational forms to instruct the new 
generations of Germans in the superiority of republican values. 
Tucholsky targeted individuals for criticism to effectively high-
light the real problems Germany was facing. Tucholsky did not 
have all the answers, and he knew it. He stayed away from spe-
cific solutions, perhaps because he believed the establishment of 
a real republic would itself determine solutions through debate 
and dialogue. He instead strove to focus on the factors inhibit-
ing the implementation of a true republic and influence those 
with the capability to create changes in the system to step for-
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ward and do it. He sought through satire and criticism to point 
out the absurdities of the old system and its restrictions on indi-
vidual freedoms and Germany's development. 
That Tucholsky wrote so much in the first years of the 
Republic can be seen as a commitment by him to inspire those 
capable to undertake the necessary actions to change the system. 
Unfortunately, few were willing to listen to his voice of inspira-
tion. Further, T ucholsky did not have" a large readership. Leading 
Social Democrats, certainly aware of his writings, could have 
been repulsed by Tucholsky's intellectual status. Other politi-
cians and Social Democrats as well were simply interested in 
acquiring and maintaining political power. That meant main-
taining order and reviving a ravaged economy. They believed 
they did not have the option of experimenting with new ideas 
beyond those implemented in the creation of the Republic. 
These beliefs can neither be confirmed nor rejected in this paper. 
What can be discerned is the fact that Tucholsky did not stray far 
off the practical line and never out of the political sphere. He was 
not, of the earlier' intellectual tradition of focusing on a special 
field and ignoring the political realm. The demands he expressed 
in his writings were pragmatic' and viable. They required, how-
ever, courage and political will. Unfortunately, this will was lack-
ing among the responsible leaders of the Republic, foremost 
among those of the SPD. Tucholsky's criticism was valid and 
cannot be dismissed as hopeless idealism. He had a voice which 
was heard, but unfortunately not heeded. 
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